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1 Introduction
The last couple of years have witnessed a surge of academic as well as jour-
nalistic writings on the underground economy.1 One reason for this interest
is that the incapability of the government to tax some sectors of the econ-
omy creates various distortions in the behaviour of economic agents. A large
amount of work in the informal sector will, Ceteris paribus, reduce the tax
base, and for a given revenue it implies an increase in taxes for formal sector
workers. Higher taxes, in turn, may result in a further increase in the amount
of informal sector work. A spiral may emerge with higher taxes and a larger
informal sector.
The informal sector is of significant size in both North and South Europe,
although we do see some variation. In Southern Europe, informal sector work
amounts to 17-18 percent of GDP (Spain and Italy, see Ahn and De la Rica
(1997) and Siesto (1992)), whereas it comes to 2-6 percent of GDP in the
Nordic Countries (Pedersen and Smith (1998)).2
Early theoretical contributions of tax evasion are provided by Allingham
and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), where underreporting of income
is modeled as a decision made under uncertainty. Since these early contribu-
tions, a number of papers have enhanced the basic model of individual be-
haviour by, for example, incorporating endogenous labour supply decisions.3
Also general equilibrium models with tax evasion have been developed (see
for example Cremer and Gahvari (1993)).
Although there has been a recent explosion of the literature on tax eva-
sion and tax avoidance, the research is mainly carried out within the public
finance tradition. In this literature wages are either assumed to be fixed or
determined by market clearing.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the macro economic eﬀects of tax-
and punishment policies. In particular, we focus on how a revenue neutral
change in the government controls of the informal sector aﬀects labour market
performance. Hence, if the government were to control the underground
economy more severely, either through higher punishment fees or through a
more frequent auditing of informal sector workers and/or firms, what would
then happen to unemployment, sector allocation, relative prices and wages?
For example, would higher punishment fees or a higher audit rate lead to
1See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) and Schneider and Eneste (2000) for two recent
surveys of tax avoidence and tax evasion.
2These diﬀerence may be caused by cultural diﬀerences implying diﬀerent moral costs
of working in the informal sector. See Kolm and Larsen 2001 for a paper on this issue.
3See for example Andersen (1977) and Sandmo (1981) for early contributions of en-
dogenous labour supply and underreporting of income.
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a smaller informal sector? Furthermore, what happens to the number of
unemployed workers?
To that end, we develop a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring
matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargains. Workers face job oppor-
tunities also in the informal sector and search for jobs in both the formal and
the informal sector.
We find that increased government control of the informal sector in terms
of higher punishment fees (i) increase the size of the formal sector and re-
duces the size of the informal sector (ii) reduces real producer wages in both
sectors (iii) reduces the formal sector relative price, and (iv) reduces the
unemployment rate. Considering the impact of a higher audit rate is less
clear. A higher audit rate will most likely (i) reduce the size of the informal
sector relative the size of the formal sector, (ii) reduce the formal sector rel-
ative price, and (iii) have an ambiguous impact on unemployment and real
producer wages.
One can clarify the contribution of this paper as follows. First, we incor-
porate an imperfectly competitive labour market. This facilitates an analysis
of how tax- and punishment policies aﬀect wage setting and unemployment.
Previous literature on tax evasion has either assumed that wages are fixed or
determined by market clearing, which obviously is an inadequate framework
to use when analyzing how tax evasion opportunities aﬀect wage setting and
unemployment.4 Second, we develope a two sector matching model including
a goods demand side, and hence endogenously determined relative prices.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
the equilibrium variables are derived. In section 3, we examine how the
equilibrium variables (tightness, relative prices, real producer wages, sector
allocation, and unemployment) are aﬀected by a fully financed change in the
punishment system. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy consists of two sectors, a formal sector and an informal sector.
Consumers perceive the goods produced in the two sectors to be diﬀerent.
The government audits the economy. With probability p a worker-firm pair
4An exception is Chang and Lai (1996) who examine the relationship between under-
reporting of income and total tax revenues by taking into account the eﬃciency wage
hypothesis. See also Kolm and Larsen (2001) who examines how increased controls of the
underground economy aﬀects wages and unemployment. Their paper, however, considers a
complete segmented labour market where wage demands in the formal sector is unaﬀected
by the underground economy.
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in the underground economy is detected and then has to pay a punishment
fee and the match will be dissolved.
2.1 Matching
Workers search for jobs in both the formal and the informal sector. We
assume that only unemployed workers search for jobs. This is a simplification,
i.e. we do not acknowledge that the connection to the labour market given
by working in the formal sector, brings about job opportunities not available
while unemployed. Workers accept job oﬀers as long as the expected payoﬀ
exceeds their reservation wage.5 We disregard any moral considerations the
worker could have preventing him or her from applying for a job in the
informal sector.6 The matching function is given by
X = v1−ηuη,
where u is unemployment and v is the total number of vacancies supplied
by firms. The labour force is normalised to unity, whereby we interpret u as
the unemployment rate and v as the vacancy rate. The number of vacan-
cies supplied by the formal sector and the informal sector are vj, j = F, I,
and hence v = vF + vI . The worker’s transition rates into the two sectors
can be expressed as λF = βX
u
= βθ1−η = βπ (θ) , and λI = (1− β) X
u
=
(1− β) θ1−η = (1− β) π (θ) , where β = vF
v
is the fraction of vacancies sup-
plied in the formal sector and θ = v/u is overall labour market tightness.
The term π (θ) can be interpreted as the probability of a worker getting any
job oﬀer. The transition rates facing firms is equal across firms and given by
q = X
v
= θ−η. Furthermore, we define labour market tightness for the formal
sector as θF = vF/u and labour market tightness for the informal sector as
θI = vI/u where hence θF + θI = θ.
2.2 Workers
Unemployed workers have the opportunity to apply for jobs in both the
formal sector and the informal sector. Let λF and λI be interpreted as the
probabilities of finding a job in the formal sector and in the informal sector,
5We focus on the non-trivial case where it is not optimal to refect job oﬀers from one
sector and wait for a job oﬀer from the other sector in order to have an economy with
both a formal- and an informal sector.
6In a companion paper, ’Moral costs, the informal sector and unemployment’ (Kolm
and Larsen 2001) we deal with this issue by letting moral costs be important for the
relative sizes of the formal and the informal sector.
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respectively. The present discounted value of unemployment, U , employment
in the formal sector, EF , and employment in the informal sector, EI , are
given in the following flow value equations:
rU = λF (EF − U) + λI(EI − U), (1)
rEF =
w (1− t)
P
+ s(U − EF ), (2)
rEI =
w (1− pδ)
P
+ (s+ p) (U − EI), (3)
where r is the exogenous discount rate, t gives the income tax rate, δ captures
the proportion of the evaded income a worker has to pay as a punishment
fee if detected withholding the government taxes, and p is the audit rate.
s is the exogenous separation rate. The match is dissolved when detected
which implies that the separation rate in the informal sector exceeds the
formal sector separation rate. The immediate income received in each state
is expressed in real terms by division with the general price level, P . P is the
cost-of-living index which is linear homogenous in the two goods prices, P F
and P I , and can be derived from consumer preferences.7 The goods prices,
and hence the general price level, is in equilibrium determined by market
clearing and is taken as given by the individual firms and workers. It is of
no importance for the results weather the flow value equations given in this
section, and the next section, are given in real or in nominal terms.
2.3 Firms
The marginal productivity of a worker is yj, j = F, I. Hiring costs are de-
noted kj, j = F, I and q is interpreted as the firm’s probability of finding a
worker. Since the value functions for workers are expressed in real terms, we
express the value functions for firms also in real terms.
Firms in the formal sector are characterized by the arbitrage equations:
rJF =
PF
P
yF − w
F (1 + z)
P
+ s(V F − JF ), (4)
rV F = q(JF − V F )− k
F
P
, (5)
where JF is the value of having a filled job in the formal sector, V F is the
value of an unfilled job in this sector, and the parameter z is the payroll tax
rate.
7Homothetic preferences are assumed which implies that all consumers face the same
price index.
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Similarly, firms in the informal sector have JI and V I determined by:
rJI =
P I
P
yI − w
I (1 + pα)
P
+ (s+ p) (V I − JI), (6)
rV I = q(JI − V I)− k
I
P
, (7)
where α is the proportion of the evaded wages the firm has to pay as a
punishment fee for cheating the government on payroll taxes when supplying
informal sector jobs.
2.4 Wages
In the wage bargains, the firm and the worker take the market clearing prices
as given. Wages, wj , j = F, I solve first order conditions from the Nash
Bargaining Solutions with the worker’s bargaining power being equal to γ:
γ
1− γ
1
φF
¡
JF − V F
¢
= EF − U, (8)
γ
1− γ
1
φI
¡
JI − V I
¢
= EI − U, (9)
where φF = 1+z
1−t and φ
I = 1+pα
1−pδ are the tax- and punishment wedges.
By use of equations (1)-(7) in equations (8) and (9), and assuming free
entry, V j = 0, j = F, I, and symmetric conditions facing firms and workers
within each sector, the relevant real producer wages are:
ωF = w
F (1 + z)
PF
= γyF
µ
1 + ρ
µ
θF + θ
I
∆
¶¶
, (10)
ωI = w
I (1 + pα)
P I
= γyI
µ
1 + ρ∆
µ
θF + θ
I
∆
¶¶
, (11)
where
∆ = ψP
FyF
P IyI
, (12)
and
ψ = φ
I
φF
=
1 + pα
1− pδ /
1 + z
1− t . (13)
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where we have used that kj = ρP jyj , j = F, I . That is, we assume that
hiring costs are related to the value of the marginal productivity of a worker,
more resources are used to find a high productivity worker. ψ is the punish-
ment/tax wedge between the informal sector and the formal sector. We will
simply refer to ψ as the wedge. It seems reasonable to focus on the case when
ψ < 1, that is when the government does not audit or punish the informal
sector to the same extent as the formal sector is taxed. This is, however, of
no importance for the results.
The wage rules in (10) and (11) capture the wage demand, i.e., the bar-
gained wage for a given relative price and tightness. The relative price and
sector tightness are clearly endogenous variables and will be determined in
equilibrium. However, before proceeding to the determination of equilibrium,
we can explore the consequences of a change in the tax- and punishment rates,
α, δ, z, and t, and the audit rate, p, on wage demands. For given equilibrium
variables, an increase in the punishment rates or the audit rate for given tax
rates, will reduce the formal sector wage demands, and increase the wage
demands in the informal sector. The reason is that the value of employ-
ment has fallen in the informal sector relative to the formal sector. Workers
employed in the informal sector hence face a reduced value of employment
relative to unemployment and will push for higher wages. The opposite holds
for workers employed in the formal sector, which causes formal sector workers
to moderate their wage demands. Analogous interpretation can be given for
changes in the tax rates for a given punishment policy.
It also follows from (10) and (11) that proportional changes in the tax
and punishment system, leaving the wedge unaﬀected, will have no impact on
wage demands since these changes have no eﬀect on the value of employment
relative to the value of unemployment in each respective sector.
2.5 Labour market tightness
Labour market tightness for the formal and the informal sector is determined
by equations (4),(5), (6) and (7) using the free entry condition and the wage
equations (10) and (11) :
(r + s) θη = (1− γ)ρ − γ
µ
θF + θ
I
∆
¶
, (14)
(r + s+ p) θη = (1− γ)ρ − γ
¡
∆θF + θI
¢
. (15)
Note, however, that equations (14) and (15) determine labour market tight-
ness in the formal sector and the informal sector conditioned on the relative
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price, i.e., ∆ = ψPF yF
P IyI
. Thus we have two equations in the three unknowns,
labour market tightness in the two sectors and the relative price, θF , θI , PF
P I
.
Hence to close the system, we need to incorporate the product market.
Before doing that it turns out to be useful to derive the employment rates.
2.6 Employment
Steady state employment- and unemployment rates are derived by consider-
ing the flows into and out of employment. The equations determining the
employment rates nF , nI , and the unemployment rate, u, are given by:
λFu = sFnF ,
λIu = sInI ,
nF + nI = 1− u.
Solving for the employment rates and the unemployment rate, we obtain:
nI =
θI(θ)−η
s+p
1 + θ
F (θ)−η
s
+ θ
I(θ)−η
s+p
, (16)
nF =
θF (θm)−η
s
1 + θ
F (θ)−η
s
+ θ
I(θ)−η
s+p
, (17)
u =
1
1 + θ
F (θ)−η
s
+ θ
I(θ)−η
s+p
. (18)
The relative sizes of the two sectors in terms of employment is therefore
given by
nF
nI
=
θF
θI
s+ p
s
. (19)
2.7 Product market equilibrium
In each period, the product markets clear and the relative price is determined.
This relative price can be derived from optimising consumers. Individuals
derive utility from consumption of two goods, CF and CI . CF is produced
in the formal sector and CI is produced in the informal sector. Preferences
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are homothetic and captured by the following instantaneous utility func-
tion U
¡
CFi , C
I
i
¢
.8 In addition, the workers have an instantaneous budget
restriction which restricts consumption of the two goods through the income
allocated to consumption in each period. Let us for now assume that work-
ers consume all their income in each period, although this is not a necessary
assumption.
The consumption bundle chosen in each period by each individual is op-
timally determined by maximising the instantaneous utility function, given
the instantaneous budget restriction. This yields the familiar condition
UF (CFi ,CIi )
UI(CFi ,CIi )
= PF/P I , which merely states that the mix of consumption goods
should be chosen so that the marginal rate of substitution equals the rela-
tive price. From the individual first order conditions of choosing a utility
maximising consumption mix, and the instantaneous budget restriction, we
can derive each individual’s demand for the two goods. With homothetic
preferences, the demand for the two goods are linear in the income measure
which implies that we can aggregate the demand for goods over individuals
simply by aggregating over the income that restricts consumption. The ag-
gregate demand function for the two goods are then derived by combining
UF (CF ,CI)
UI (CF ,CI )
= PF/P I and the aggregate budget constraint. The relative price
is obtained by equalising demand with supply of the two goods. The aggre-
gate supply of the two goods (with one worker employed in each firm and
the labour force normalised to unity) is given by Y F = yFnF and Y I = yInI .
Equalising aggregate demand and aggregate supply leads to the following
equation for the relative price
UCF
³
yFnF
yInI
, 1
´
UCI
³
yFnF
yInI
, 1
´ = PF
P I
. (20)
For simplicity, we assume a Cobb Douglas Utility function, U =
¡
CF
¢σ ¡
CI
¢1−σ
,
using the Cobb Douglas assumption together with equation (19), we can
rewrite equation (20) as
σs
(1− σ) (s+ p)
yIθI
yFθF
=
P F
P I
, (21)
8UF , UF > 0, and UFF , UII < 0. Homothetic preferences allow for aggregation of
demand across individuals with diﬀerent incomes, although the less restrictive assumption
of quasi homothetic preferences would be enough. It is, however, convenient to have
one encompassing price index for all individuals which is assured by the assumption of
homothetic preferences.
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which is an equation in the three unknowns θF , θI , and PF
P I
.
Note that the income level restricting consumption for consumers in each
period is of no importance to the relative price, due to the assumption of
homothetic preferences. Hence, it is not necessary to assume that all income
is consumed in each period.
2.8 Equilibrium
Now we can charachterise the equilibrium in the labour and goods markets
with the equations (14), (15), and (21). For simplicity, we assume that
yI = yF = y.9 We have:
(r + s)
¡
θF + θI
¢η
=
(1− γ)
ρ − γ
µ
θF + θ
I
∆
¶
, (22)
(r + s+ p)
¡
θF + θI
¢η
=
(1− γ)
ρ − γ∆
µ
θF + θ
I
∆
¶
, (23)
ψ σs
(1− σ) (s+ p)
θI
θF
= ∆, (24)
where we recall that ∆ = ψPF
P I
. Firms will enter into the two sectors as long
as the expected vacancy costs are equal to the discounted profit. Since the
expected time to fill a vacancy 1/q =
¡
θF + θI
¢η
is equal for firms in the
two sectors, the discounted profit relatively to the per period vacancy cost is
going to be equal for firms in the two sectors. This is captured by equations
(22) and (23). Equation (24) gives the relative price as a function of the
relative supply derived from consumer preferences.
Because the separation rate for informal sector jobs is higher than the
separation rate for formal sector jobs, it is more attractive for a firm to
enter the formal sector since jobs on the average last a longer time in the
formal sector. On the other hand if ψ < 1, firms in the informal sector are
expected to be punished less than firms in the formal sector are taxed, which
makes it more attractive to enter the informal sector. However, whether it
is more attractive to enter one or the other sector also depends on the prices
consumers pay for the diﬀerent goods produced. Or put diﬀerently, entry into
one sector rather than the other sector because the relative attractiveness of
the tax/punishment system or the diﬀerence in the separation rates will be
counteracted by adjustments in the relative price. Entry into the formal
sector will increases the supply of formal goods and hence reduce the relative
9There is no apriori reason to assume that one of the productivities should be greater
than the other.
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price PF/P I , which in turn reduces the relative attractiveness of entering
the formal sector.
We only consider fully financed reforms. Hence, the government budget
restriction is always satisfied and is given by:
nFωF
µ
1− 1
φF
¶
+ nIωI ψ∆(1−
1
φI
) =
R
PF
. (25)
The budget restriction is a function of the tax- and punishment wedges,
φF and φI , and the audit rate, p. Recall that the producer wages, employment
rates, and ∆ are functions of the wedge, ψ = φIφF , and the audit rate p, where
we note that p appears both in the wedge ψ and in the informal sector
separation rate, s+ p. The tax rates, t and z and δ and α, will not appear in
the government budget restriction directly when all substitutions are done.
This reflects that t and z are equivalent instruments, and so are δ and α.
Hence it does not matter if we tax (punish) the firm side or the worker side.
A change in δ and α is captured by a change in φI , and a change in z and t
is captured by a change in φF .
From (25) it is clear that an increase in φF and φI that leaves ψ and p
unaﬀected, will increase the government revenue. Hence for a given wedge,
the government can chose t, z, δ and α so as to reap any level of revenue. This
is very convenient and implies that we can investigate the impact of various
reforms on the equilibrium variables, without explicitly incorporating the
government budget restriction.
3 Comparative statics
This section considers the impact of two reforms on tightness, relative prices,
real producer wages, sector allocation and unemployment. The first reform
involves a change in the punishment rates, α and/or δ, whereas the second
reform involves a change in the audit rate p. Both reforms are fully financed
and will be discussed in turn below.
Before considering the reforms we will engage in some substitution in or-
der reduce the equation system in (22)-(24) and to trace down some intuition.
First, we eliminate
³
θF + θI∆
´
from (22) and (23) above. This yields
∆ =
(1−γ)
ρ − (r + s+ p) θ
η
(1−γ)
ρ − (r + s) θ
η
> 0
< 1
, (26)
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where ∆ = ψPF
P I
< 1. Hence, the free entry conditions determines the rel-
ative price P
F
P I
conditional on total tightness θ. Changes in ψ will induce
proportional adjustments in the relative price so that ∆ is unaﬀected.
Equation (26) reflects the discussion in connection with equations (22)-
(24), and verifies that it is ψ and the diﬀerence in the separation rates that
are important for the entry and exit into the two sectors, and hence for the
relative price. This is easily seen by considering the following two imaginary
polar cases. If ψ < 1, and p = 0, we have ∆ = 1 and hence PF
P I
= 1ψ > 1.
That is, the informal sector is more attractive in the sense that informal
firms are expected to be punished less than formal firms are taxed. Hence
firms keep entering the informal sector until the formal sector relative price
has increased to such an extent that formal firms are fully compensated for
the fact that ψ < 1. If on the other hand ψ = 1, and p > 0, we have that
PF
P I
= ∆ < 1. That is, the formal sector is more attractive in the sense that
jobs on average last a longer time, and the entry of firms into the formal
sector will reduce the relative price on formal goods below unity. However
with ψ < 1, and p > 0, we have PF
P I
= ∆ψ which can be either smaller or
larger than unity reflecting the two counteracting incentives determining the
relative attractiveness of the two sectors.
Moreover, we have that
∂∆
∂θ = −
ηθη−1 (1− γ) p
ρ
³
(1−γ)
ρ − (r + s)
¡
θF + θI
¢η´2 < 0. (27)
That is, the relative price P
F
P I
falls with an increase in total tightness for a
given ψ and for given separation rates. We know that p > 0 implies that
the informal sector is relatively less attractive, since jobs last on average a
shorter time in the informal sector. However, when θ is low, it is quite easy
to fill a vacancy. The fact that jobs separate easier in the informal sector
is hence not as important since, in case of separation, the open vacancy
can quickly be filled again. A large θ will, for the same reasons, increase the
importance of a job lasting a substantial number of time periods. An increase
in total tightness will reduce the attractiveness of the informal sector for given
separation rates and ψ, which induces a reallocation of workers towards the
formal sector with a reduction in the formal sector relative price, P
F
P I
, as a
consequence.
By substituting the expression for ∆ given by equation (26) into (22), we
get
12
(r + s) θη = (1− γ)ρ − γ

θF + θI
Ã
(1−γ)
ρ − (r + s+ p) θ
η
(1−γ)
ρ − (r + s) θ
η
!−1
 , (28)
where θ = θF+θI , which is one equation in the two unknowns θF , and θI .We
hence have a relationship between sector tightness, and most convenient this
relationship is independent of the relative punishment rate, ψ. The relative
price will adjust so to make this relationship independent of ψ. It will,
however, depend on p. Diﬀerentiating (28) with respect to sector tightness
and we have
∂θF
∂θI
= −
(r + s) ηθη−1 + γ∆
³
1− θI∆
∂∆
∂θ
´
(r + s) ηθη−1 + γ∆
³
∆− θI∆
∂∆
∂θ
´ < −1 (29)
where ∆ < 1. From (29), we have that informal tightness crowds out formal
tightness, and vice versa. This follows because a Ceteris paribus increase in
θI, increases the value of unemployment, which induces a wage push also in
the formal sector; formal tightness falls.
Equation (29) also reveals that a one unit increase in informal tightness
will reduce formal tightness by more than one unit. This is a consequence of
∆ being smaller than unity. Recall that∆ < 1 follows because p > 0 prevents
firms from entering the informal sector to some extent, and hence induces the
relative price, P
F
P I
, to be lower than elsewise would have been the case. This
price premium facing informal sector firms due to the diﬀerence in separation
rates make the informal sector relatively more attractive once the match has
taken place and there is bargaining over wages. This gives the informal
sector a larger weight in the wage bargains in the two sectors compared to
the weight given to the formal sector. An increase in informal tightness
hence imposes a rather strong wage push in the two sectors. The increase
in informal tightness is dampened whereas the formal tightness falls. The
reduction in formal tightness does, however, induce some wage moderation,
but since wage demands are not equally responsive to changes in the formal
sector tightness, formal tightness falls by more than the increase in informal
tightness.
3.1 Changes in the punishment fee
This section is concerned with the impact on tightness, relative prices, real
producer wages, sector allocation, and unemployment of a fully financed
13
change in the punishment fee given by a change in α and/or δ. Tax rates z
and/or t are adjusting so to keep the government budget in (25) balanced at
all times. The audit rate p is taken as given throughout this reform. As is
clear from (22)-(24), (16)-(18), (10) and (11), the equilibrium variables will
only be aﬀected by changes in α, δ, z, and t through the wedge, ψ. Hence,
we can conduct comparative statics with respect to ψ without explicitly
having to account for the government budget restriction since any government
revenue can be reaped by appropriate changes in α, δ, z, and t at any given
wedge.
3.1.1 Labour market tightness and relative prices
The eﬀects on tightness and the relative price are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 10A fully financed increase in the punishment fee, δ or α,
will increase tightness in the formal sector, θF , and reduce tightness in the
informal sector, θI. Total tightness, θ, increases. The relative price, PF
P I
,
falls.
Proof Diﬀerentiate equation (24) with respect to θI and ψ, taking into
account that ∆ is a function of θF and θI as given by (26) and that θF is a
function of θI through equation (28). This yields
∂θI
∂ψ =
(1− σ)
σ
s
s + p
Ã
∂∆
∂θ
µ
∂θF
∂θI
+ 1
¶
θF
θI
+∆
∂ θFθI
∂θI
!−1
, (30)
where
∂(θF /θI)
∂θI =
³
∂θF
∂θI θ
I − θF
´
/
¡
θI
¢2
< 0, and ∂θ
F
∂θI + 1 < 0 from (29).
The equation is negative if
−∂∆∂θ
µ
γ θ
F
θI
+∆γ
¶
θF −∆
¡
(r + s+ p) ηθη−1 + γ
¢
−∆θ
F
θI
¡
(r + s+ p) ηθη−1 + γ∆
¢
< 0,
10For an intuitive intrepretation, the propositions are expressed as if an increase in φI
financed by adjustments in φF implies that ψ = φI/φF increases. Other, although perhaps
less plausible cases, are of course also incorporated. The propositions simply captures
fully financed changes in the tax- and punishment systems that aﬀect the relative tax and
punishment rates between the formal and informal economy.
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where we have substituted expressions for
³
∂θF
∂θI + 1
´
and
∂ θ
F
θI
∂θI . Substituting
for ∂∆∂θ and using equation (14) we obtain the suﬃcient condition:
(r + s+ p) ηθη−1
¡
∆θF + θI
¢
+∆
¡
(r + s) ηθη−1 + γ
¢
θF
µ
1 +∆θ
F
θI
¶
> 0.
Thus, ∂θ
I
∂ψ < 0. Thereby
∂θF
∂θI
∂θI
∂ψ > 0 and
∂θ
∂ψ =
³
∂θF
∂θI + 1
´
∂θI
∂ψ > 0. Regard-
ing the relative price we have P
F
P I
= ∆ψ where
∂
³
PF
PI
´
∂ψ =
³
∂∆
∂ψψ −∆
´
/ψ2 < 0
since ∂∆∂ψ =
∂∆
∂θ
∂θ
∂ψ < 0.
The smaller the diﬀerence in separation rates, the smaller is ∂θF∂θI and, the
more equal to unity is ∆ and, the more perfect crowding out do we have.
With perfect crowding out, i.e., ∂θ
F
∂θI = −1, total tightness is unaﬀected by
changes in ψ.
An increase in ψ will make it relatively worse to be in the underground
economy. Hence the value of employment in the informal sector falls relative
to unemployment which increases informal sector wage demands. In the
formal sector, on the other hand, wage demands fall because the value of
formal employment has increased relative to unemployment. Formal sector
workers thus become more keen on keeping their jobs and therefore demand
lower wages.
From the firms’ perspective, these happenings tend to increase the pro-
ducer costs in the informal sector whereas producer costs in the formal sector
tend to fall. Exit from the informal sector and entry into the formal sector are
initiated. That is, labour market tightness in the formal sector, θF increases
and labour market tightness in the informal sector, θI falls.
Relative prices are now aﬀected. The reallocation of jobs towards the for-
mal sector increases the production of formal sector produced goods relative
to informal sector produced goods, which makes the price on formal goods
fall relative to the price of informal goods. The relative price adjustments
will eventually restore the equilibrium since the increase in the price of in-
formal goods eventually makes it profitable to produce informal goods and
hence to exit the informal sector is not profitable. For the same reason will
the reduced price on formal sector produced goods eventually eliminate the
profitability of entering the formal sector.
Regarding the equations for labour market tightness, the fact that ∆ < 1
implies that the informal sector is more important for the wage bargains than
is the formal sector. We show below that both wages decrease in equilibrium.
The result is that total tightness increases.
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3.1.2 Real producer wages
The equilibrium producer wages are given by equations (10) and (11) al-
though now we have to consider potential eﬀects working through tightness
and the relative price. We summarize the eﬀects of changes in the tax- and
punishment rates on producer wages in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 A fully financed increase in the punishment fee, δ or α, will
reduce the real producer wages, ωF , and ωI, in the two sectors.
Proof Diﬀerentiating equations (10) and (11) with respect to ψ yields:
∂ωF
∂ψ = γρy
µ
∂θF
∂ψ +
∂θI
∂ψ
1
∆ −
θI
∆2
∂∆
∂θ
∂θ
∂ψ
¶
, (31)
∂ωI
∂ψ = γρy
µ
∂θF
∂ψ ∆+ θ
F ∂∆
∂θ
∂θ
∂ψ +
∂θI
∂ψ
¶
. (32)
From (14) and (15), we have:
θη = (1− γ)
(r + s) ρ − γ
³
θF + θI∆
´
(r + s)
, (33)
θη = (1− γ)
(r + s+ p) ρ − γ
∆
³
θF + θI∆
´
(r + s+ p)
. (34)
Diﬀerentiation brings out the following expressions
ηθη−1 ∂θ∂ψ = −
γ
(r + s)
µ
∂θF
∂ψ +
∂θI
∂ψ
1
∆ −
θI
∆2
∂∆
∂θ
∂θ
∂ψ
¶
, (35)
ηθη−1 ∂θ∂ψ = −
γ
(r + s+ p)
µ
∂θF
∂ψ ∆+ θ
F ∂∆
∂θ
∂θ
∂ψ +
∂θI
∂ψ
¶
, (36)
where we know from the proof of proposition 1 that ∂θ∂ψ > 0. This implies
that ∂θ
F
∂ψ +
∂θI
∂ψ
1
∆ −
θI
∆2
∂∆
∂θ
∂θ
∂ψ < 0 and
∂θF
∂ψ ∆+ θ
F ∂∆
∂θ
∂θ
∂ψ +
∂θI
∂ψ < 0 have to hold.
Hence we have that the equilibrium real producer wages have to fall in both
sectors.
The equilibrium eﬀects on real producer wages of changes in ψ is entirely
explained by changes in the reallocation of firms across sectors, θF and θI ,
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and eﬀects on the total level of tightness θ.11 We discuss the two eﬀects in
what follows.
Because ∆ < 1, the informal sector is given a larger weight in the wage
bargains than is the formal sector. Hence the wage moderation following a
reduction in θI is going to be larger than the wage push following a equally
sized increase in θF . For a given level of total tightness, the reallocation of
firms towards the formal sector will induce wage moderation in both sectors.
However, total tightness increases for exactly the same reasons. That is,
there is a rather strong wage moderation induced by the reallocation of firms
towards the formal sector as compared to the wage push; tightness in the
formal sector tends to increase by more than tightness in the informal sector
falls. (Recall the discussion below equation (27).) When total tightness
increases it becomes relatively less attractive to enter the informal sector
since the separation rate is higher in the informal sector than in the formal
sector, which further reinforces the reallocation of firms towards the formal
sector. Hence, there will be a further reduction in the relative price (that
is, further reductions in the relative price than was induced in order to fully
counteract the direct eﬀects on wage demands of a change in ψ, see footnote
11). This tends to increase real producer wages in the formal sector and
reduce the informal sector real producer wages. However, this eﬀect can
never dominate the eﬀects induced by the fact that the reallocation brings
about stronger wage moderation than wage push; real producer wages fall in
both sectors.
3.1.3 Employment
We summarize the results on employment and unemployment in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 A fully financed increase in the punishment fee, δ or α, will
increase the employment rate in the formal sector, nF , and reduce the em-
ployment rate in the informal sector, nI. The unemployment rate, u, falls
with the reform.
11The immediate eﬀect of an increase in ψ for given tightness and prices is that wage
demands increase in the informal sector whereas the wage demands fall in the formal
sector. This induces a reallocation of firms towards the formal sector with a reduction
in formal sector relative prices as a consequence. From the previous analyses we know
that ψ will induce proportional adjustment in the relative price so that ∆ is unaﬀected by
changes in ψ for a given level of total tightness. The direct eﬀect of an increase in ψ on
wage demands is hence fully counteracted in equilbrium by relative price adjustments.
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Proof Diﬀerentiate equation (16) and (17) with respect to ψ gives:
∂nI
∂ψ =
∂(θI(θ)−η)
∂ψ
³
1 + θ
F (θ)−η
s
´
− θ
I(θ)−η
s
∂(θF (θ)−η)
∂ψ
(s+ p)
³
1 + θ
F (θ)−η
s
+ θ
I(θ)−η
s+p
´2 < 0
∂nF
∂ψ =
∂(θF (θ)−η)
∂ψ
³
1 + θ
I (θ)−η
s+p
´
− θ
F (θ)−η
s
∂(θI(θ)−η)
∂ψ
s
³
1 + θ
F (θ)−η
s
+ θ
I (θ)−η
s+p
´2 > 0,
where we use that
∂
¡
θI (θ)−η
¢
∂ψ = θ
−η
µ
1− ηθ
I
θ
µ
∂θF
∂θI
+ 1
¶¶
∂θI
∂ψ < 0,
∂
¡
θF (θ)−η
¢
∂ψ = θ
−η
µ
∂θF
∂θI
µ
1− ηθ
F
θ
¶
− ηθ
F
θ
¶
∂θI
∂ψ > 0.
Furthermore, the unemployment rate is aﬀected in the following way:
∂u
∂ψ = −
s+p
s
∂(θF (θ)−η)
∂ψ +
∂(θI(θ)−η)
∂ψ³
1 + θ
F (θ)−η
s
+ θ
I(θ)−η
s+p
´2 1s+ p.
As s+p
s
> 1 and ∂θ
I
∂ψ < 0 a suﬃcient condition for
∂u
∂ψ < 0 is that
∂θF
∂θI
µ
1− ηθ
F
θ
¶
− ηθ
F
θ + 1− η
µ
1− θ
F
θ
¶µ
∂θF
∂θI
+ 1
¶
< 0⇔
(1− η)
µ
∂θF
∂θI
+ 1
¶
< 0,
which is satisfied.
It comes as no surprise that increased punishment fees relative to tax
rates induce a reallocation of workers from the informal sector towards the
formal sector. An increased wedge increases the transition rate into formal
sector employment, whereas the opposite movements occur in the informal
sector.
The unemployment rate falls because tightness in the formal sector in-
creases by more than tightness in the informal sector falls. The transition
rate into the formal sector employment therefore tends to increase by more
than the transition rate into the informal sector tends to fall. As the sep-
aration rate from the informal sector is larger than the separation rate for
the formal sector, this reinforces the fact that unemployment falls with an
increase in ψ.
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3.2 Changes in the audit rate
This section is concerned with the impact on tightness, relative prices, real
producer wages, sector allocation, and unemployment of a fully financed
change in the audit rate p. The tax rates z and/or t and the punishment
fees α and/or δ are adjusting so as to keep the government budget in (25)
balanced at all times. As is clear from (22)-(24), (16)-(18), (10) and (11),
the equilibrium variables will be aﬀected by changes in p both through the
wedge ψ, and through the informal sector separation rate, s + p. However,
from the government budget restriction in (25) we know that there is always
an appropriate adjustment in z and/or t and the punishment rates α and/or
δ that will produce any level of government revenues for a given ψ. Hence
to clarify how changes in p aﬀect the equilibrium variables via the informal
sector separation rate, s + p, this reform considers changes in p for a given
ψ.
From the previous analysis we could conclude how changes in ψ aﬀected
the equilibrium variables and it is straight forward to extent the analysis
below to incorporate that ψ is increased by an increase in p. The discussion
in the introduction and in the conclusion sumarizes the full eﬀects of an
increase in p.
3.2.1 Labour market tightness and relative prices
The eﬀects on tightness and on the relative price are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 A fully financed increase in the audit rate, p (for a given ψ),
will decrease total tightness, ∂θ∂p < 0. A suﬃcient condition for the relative
price, P
F
P I
, to decrease, ∂∆∂p < 0 is that (s+ p) (1− η) > ηr.
Proof Diﬀerentiating the equilibrium system, equations (22) - (24) give:
dθF
dp
= γθF
(r + s) ηθη−1
³
∆θF + θI∆
r+s+p
r+s
− s+pγ θ
η
´
+ γ
³
θF + θI∆
´
−D
dθI
dp
= γθF

 ηθ
η−1
³
pθI
∆ + (r + s)
³
∆θF + θI∆ −
θη(s+p)
γ
´´
+
¡
θI +∆θF
¢ ³
γ − θ
η(s+p)
θF∆
´ 
D
dp
F
pI
dp
= −P
F
P I
θF θη
γ (r + s+ p) η 1θ + (r + s) η
1
θ (1−∆) γ
+
¡
(r + s) ηθη−1 + γ
¢
s+p
θI
+ 1θF (s+ p) (r + s) ηθ
η−1 + γ 1∆
¡
s+p
θF − η
r+s+p
θ
¢
D
,
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where
D = (s+ p) θFγ(θ
F
θI
¡
(r + s) ηθη−1 + γ
¢
γ∆+ θ
I
θF∆
¡
(r + s+ p) ηθη−1 + γ
¢
+2γ + (2 (r + s) + p) ηθη−1)
> 0.
Adding the derivatives for labour market tightness we obtain:
dθ
dp
= −γθF
µ
θI
∆ + θ
F
¶ θη(s+p)
θF + γ (1−∆)
D
< 0.
We observe that a suﬃcient condition for
dp
F
pI
dp
< 0 is thatµ
s + p
θF
− η r + s+ pθ
¶
≥ 0,
which is true for r→ 0. In general, as θ > θF , we have the suﬃcient condition
(s+ p) (1− η)− ηr ≥ 0.
We first note that we can not exclude that informal sector tightness ac-
tually increases with an increased audit rate. An increase in p reduces the
profitability for firms to enter the informal sector by reducing the average
length of a match, which works in the expected direction of reducing infor-
mal sector tightness. In addition, however, the relative price, p
F
pI
, is directly
reduced by an increase in p since the outflow of informal sector workers in-
creases for given tightness, and hence the production of informal sector goods
fall. This relative price eﬀect will increase the attractiveness for firms to en-
ter the informal sector, θI increases. Since we can not conclude whether θI
falls or increases with p, we can not conclude whether θF increases or falls
with p. The direct negative eﬀect on the relative price tends to reduce formal
sector tightness by making the formal sector less attractive for firms to en-
ter. However, if informal sector tightness falls, formal sector tightness tend
to increase since the value of unemployment is reduced and hence wages are
moderated in the formal sector; θF tends to increase. The impact on θF is
ambiguous.
Total labour market tightness, however, falls with an increase in the audit
rate. This follows because the direct negative eﬀect on the relative price
reduces formal sector tightness. For, example, if θI increases with the reform,
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we know from (29) that θF falls by more. Hence total tightness falls. The
fact that p
F
pI
falls as a direct eﬀect of a higher p, will further reduce θF and
total tightness. If, on the other hand, θI falls with the reform, formal sector
tightness increases by more, and total tightness tends to increase. However,
the fact that the relative price falls as a direct eﬀect of an increase in p will
reduce formal sector tightness, and hence the fall in θI is larger than the
increase in θF ; total tightness falls.
In general it cannot be determined whether relative prices increase or
decrease. From equation (24), we know that the direct eﬀect of an increase in
p makes the relative price fall. Hence a reduction in informal sector tightness
is always associated with a decrease in the relative price since then also
θI/θF falls. However, if labour market tightness in the informal sector should
happen to increase, the fact that θI/θF increases tends to increase the relative
price which is counteracting the direct negative eﬀect on the relative price.
Imposing the restriction that (s+ p) (1− η)−ηr > 0, ensures that relative
prices fall. For a symmetric matching function the suﬃcient condition may
be reduced to s > r. Empirically we usually find that this is true.12
3.2.2 Real producer wages
This section is concerned with the impact of a higher audit rate on equilib-
rium producer wages, equations (10) and (11). We have to consider poten-
tial eﬀects working through tightness and the relative price. The eﬀects of a
higher audit rate on producer wages is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 5 A fully financed increase in the audit rate, p (for a given
ψ), will increase producer wages in the formal sector, ∂ωF∂p > 0. The impact
on informal sector producer wages is ambiguous. However, if the suﬃcient
condition, (s+ p) (1− η)−ηr > 0, is satisfied, then in case informal producer
wages increase, they increase by less than formal producer wages increase.
Proof Diﬀerentiating equations (10) and (11) with respect to p yields:
∂ωF
∂p = γρy
µ
∂θF
∂p +
∂θI
∂p
1
∆ −
θI
∆2
∂∆
∂p
¶
, (37)
∂ωI
∂p = γρy
µ
∂θF
∂p ∆+
∂θI
∂p + θ
F ∂∆
∂p
¶
.
12See, for example, Layard et al (1991), Mortensen (1994), and Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999).
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From (14) and (15), we have:
θη = (1− γ)
(r + s) ρ − γ
θF + θI∆
(r + s)
,
θη = 1
(r + s+ p)
µ
(1− γ)
ρ − γ∆
µ
θF + θ
I
∆
¶¶
.
Diﬀerentiation brings out the following expression
ηθη−1∂θ∂p = −
γ
(r + s)
µ
∂θF
∂p +
∂θI
∂p
1
∆ −
θI
∆2
∂∆
∂p
¶
,
ηθη−1∂θ∂p = −
γ∆
(r + s+ p)
µ
∂θF
∂p +
∂θI
∂p
1
∆ +
θF
∆
∂∆
∂p
¶
− θ
η
r + s+ p
,
where we know from the proof of proposition (4) that ∂θ∂p < 0. This implies
that ∂θ
F
∂p +
∂θI
∂p
1
∆ −
θI
∆2
∂∆
∂p > 0, and therefore that
∂ωF
∂p > 0 and
∂ωF
∂p >
∂ωI
∂p
when ∂∆∂p < 0.
Firms enter into the two sectors until the expected vacancy costs are
equal to the discounted profits. This implies that the expected time it takes
to fill a vacancy is equal to the discounted profits relative to the per period
vacancy cost. For reasons given above, we know that total tightness fall with
an increase in p although we cannot determine how sector tightness and the
relative prices are aﬀected in general. If total tightness falls with the reform,
and hence a vacancy is expected to be filled at a faster rate, discounted profits
in the two sectors relative to per period vacancy costs has to fall as well. The
reallocation of firms across the two sectors will assure that. In the formal
sector this can only be achieved by an increase in the real producer wage. In
the informal sector, however, an increase in p will reduce the expected profits
since a match is expected to last a shorter number of periods. It is hence
not necessarily the case that the real producer wage in the informal sector
increases as a consequence of a higher p.
3.2.3 Employment
We summarize the results on relative employment in the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 6 A suﬃcient condition for the relative employment, nI
nF
, to
decrease is that (s+ p) (1− η) > ηr following a fully financed increase in the
audit rate, p (for a given ψ).
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Proof Diﬀerentiate (24) with respect to p and nI
nF
where we recall that
s
(s+p)
θI
θF =
nI
nF
and ∆ψ =
PF
P I
and we have
∂ n
I
nF
∂p =
σ
1−σ
∂ P
F
PI
∂p . Hence the sign of
∂ n
I
nF
∂p is equal to the sign of
∂ P
F
PI
∂p . From the proof of proposition 4 we have
that a suﬃcient condition for ∂
PF
PI
∂p < 0 is that (s+ p) (1− η) > ηr.
Relative employment n
I
nF
, and hence relative output, falls if the condition,
(s+ p) (1− η) > ηr, is fulfilled. That is, the direct eﬀect of an increase
in p that increases the outflow of informal employment, and hence reduces
informal sector production, dominates any reallocation eﬀects that may work
in an opposite direction. See the discussion in connection to proposition 4. It
comes as no surprise that it is the same condition that restricted the relative
price P
F
P I
to fall as the relative price falls when relative output falls.
The impact on unemployment is, however, ambiguous. It is not possible
to exclude the case that the unemployment rate falls with an increase in
the audit rate. This is so although we know that total tightness falls, and
hence the total transition rate into employment falls, and that the exit rate
from the informal sector increases.13 The reason is the reallocation eﬀect.
Consider, for example, that this reforms brings about increased inflow into
formal sector employment. This may reduce the unemployment rate although
the transition rate into the informal sector falls by more than the transition
rate into formal sector increases. This follows because the formal sector
separation rate is lower than the informal sector separation rate and hence
for a given increase in the sector transition rate into employment, formal
sector employment has to increase by more than informal sector employment
in order to balance inflows with outflow in steady state. That is, employment
in the formal sector is more sensitive to changes in its transition rate than
are informal sector employment.
4 Conclusion
This paper developed a two-sector general equilibrium matching model with
diﬀerent goods being produced in the formal sector and the informal sec-
tor. This enabled an analyses of how increased government control of the
underground economy aﬀects wage formation and unemployment. This is
something that has been ignored in the previous literature where wages have
been taken as either given or determined by market clearing. Moreover, this
paper contributes to the matching literature by including more than one
13Recall that the total transition rate into employment is λF + λI = θ1−η.
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sector where unemployed workers search for jobs in both sectors, and the
relative price is endogenously determined. This opens up the possibility for
future research on, for example, how general policies aﬀect labour market
performance in an economy with sectoral diﬀerences, as well as how policies
directed to sectors with specific characteristics aﬀect labour market perfor-
mance.
Based on this framework, we have shown that increased government con-
trol of the underground economy in terms of higher punishment fees (or in-
creased auditing for given separation rates) will reduce the size of the under-
ground economy, reduce real producer wages in the two sectors, and reduce
unemployment.
Increased punishment fees induce wage demands to increase in the infor-
mal sector and fall in the formal sector. As a consequence, firms will find it
profitable to exit from the informal sector and enter into the formal sector.
In turn, this reallocation of production will reduce the formal sector relative
price. The relative price adjustments will fully counteract the direct eﬀects
on real producer wages in equilibrium. Real producer wages and unemploy-
ment instead fall due to the rather strong wage moderation that follows this
reallocation process.
The impact on real producer wages is an important but complicated pro-
cess. When firms enter the formal sector, wage demands increase since em-
ployment perspectives in the formal sector increase, whereas wage demands
fall when firms exit the informal sector as employment perspectives fall in
this sector. The wage moderation following a firm exiting the informal sector
is, however, larger than the wage push following a firm entering the formal
sector. The reason is that the informal sector worker-firm pair faces an in-
creased probability of separation due to detection. This gives the informal
sector worker-firm pair a surplus to split every period in terms of a price
premium. Hence, the separation of an informal match is valued more than
a formation of a formal match, once the firm and worker have matched.
Consequently, the wage moderation following an exit from the informal sec-
tor exceeds the wage push following an entry into the formal sector; real
producer wages and unemployment falls.
Considering the full eﬀects on labour market performance of an increase in
the audit rate implied less clear results. In addition to the eﬀects previously
described, there was a direct positive eﬀect on the probability of a worker-
firm match being separated. The outflow from informal sector employment
into the unemployment pool hence increased. In addition, we found that the
overall transition rate into employment fell as a consequence of an increase
in the informal sector separation rate. These eﬀects tended to increase un-
employment. The overall impact of increased auditing on unemployment is
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thus ambiguous. The same ambiguous eﬀects were found considering real
producer wages. We could, however, conclude that increased separation of
the informal sector due to increased auditing most likely reinforced the reduc-
tion in the relative price, and that it also most likely reinforced the fact that
the size of the formal sector increased relatively to the size of the informal
sector.
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